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Abstract
We study employment, employee effort, wages and profit sharing when firms face
stochastic revenue shocks and when base wages and profit shares are determined
through collective bargaining. The negotiated profit share depends positively on
the relative bargaining power of the trade union and has effort-enhancing and
wage-moderating effects. We show that higher profit sharing reduces equilibrium
unemployment under circumstances with sufficiently ‘rigid’ labour market
institutions, ie sufficiently high benefit- replacement ratios and relative bargaining
powers of trade unions. Conversely, profit sharing seems to be destructive from
the point of view of employment when the labour market ‘rigidities’ are
sufficiently small.
Key words: wage bargaining, profit sharing, efficiency wages, equilibrium
unemployment
JEL classification numbers: J51, J41, G324
Tasapainotyöttömyys ja tulospalkkaus
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 19/2003
Erkki Koskela – Rune Stenbacka
Tutkimusosasto
Tiivistelmä
Julkaisussa tutkitaan työllisyyden, työntekijäin työpanoksen, peruspalkan ja tulos-
palkkauksen määräytymistä, kun yritykset kohtaavat stokastisia sokkeja ja perus-
palkka ja tulospalkkaus määräytyvät työmarkkinaosapuolten neuvotteluissa. Neu-
voteltu tulospalkkaus riippuu positiivisesti ammattiyhdistysliikkeen suhteellisesta
neuvotteluvoimasta, ja sillä on tuottavuutta lisäävä ja peruspalkkaa vähentävä vai-
kutus. Korkeampi tulospalkkaus vähentää tasapainotyöttömyyttä, kun työmarkki-
nainstituutiot ovat ”jäykkiä” siinä mielessä, että työttömyyskorvaus-palkkasuhde
ja ammattiyhdistysliikkeen neuvotteluvoima ovat ”korkeita”. Mutta jos mainitut
työmarkkinajäykkyydet ovat pieniä, niin tulospalkkaus kasvattaa tasapainotyöt-
tömyyttä.
Avainsanat: palkkaneuvottelut, tulospalkkaus, kannustinpalkat, tasapainotyöttö-
myys
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1 Introduction
Profit sharing refers to remuneration mechanisms with a performance-related
scheme consisting of a base wage plus a share of profits or revenues of firms.
Profit sharing is an empirically important phenomenon in many OECD countries.
The OECD Employment Outlook (1995) reports cross-country evidence on the
incidence of profit sharing in OECD countries. Pendleton et al (2001) and the
DICE database collected by CESifo (to be found on http://www.CESifo.de)
present more recent data on the large proportion of workplaces with financial
employee participation, in particular in the form of profit sharing schemes, in EU-
countries. As profit sharing schemes are commonly used, it is important to study
their implications for wage formation and equilibrium unemployment.
In a widespread book written for a broad audience Weitzman (1984) proposes
profit sharing systems for economies facing unemployment and stagflation
problems. In Weitzman (1985) and Weitzman (1986) the arguments are presented
in a more rigorous way. In these articles Weitzman conjectures that profit sharing
systems would dampen the business cycle fluctuations of employment and reduce
equilibrium unemployment. Some key aspects of this intuition is formally
developed by Holmlund (1991). He argues that the elasticity of substitution
between labour and capital is a crucial determinant for the employment
implications of profit sharing. More precisely, profit sharing will reduce (increase)
equilibrium unemployment if and only if the elasticity of substitution between
labour and capital exceeds (falls short of) one, while it will have no effect on
equilibrium unemployment when the elasticity of substitution between labour and
capital is equal to one. Layard and Nickell (1990) show a similar neutrality result
in the case of Cobb-Douglas production function and efficient bargaining. One
important assumption in Holmlund’s analysis is that the benefit-replacement ratio
is proportional to the total compensation, including not only the base wage but
also a component contingent on performance. In a model with capital stock
decisions, Jerger and Michaelis (1999) develop this approach further and show
how a switch from a fixed wage economy to a share economy may, in fact,
decrease aggregate unemployment with the Cobb-Douglas production function
when the outside option does not include the profit sharing. However, in all these
contributions, which focus on a world with no uncertainty, the profit sharing
instrument is assumed to have no incentive effect on effort decisions.
In the present analysis we highlight that also factors other the nature of the
production technology are important for evaluations of the employment
implications of profit sharing. We do this by focusing on a production technology
with unit elasticity of substitution between labour and capital – the case where
profit sharing would have no employment effect in light of Holmlund (1991),
Layard and Nickell (1990) or Jerger and Michaelis (1999). We extend the analysis8
of this literature by incorporating efficiency wage effects in an environment with
uncertainty. This way we are able to combine and unify elements from union
bargaining and efficiency wage theories – approaches which have typically
represented separate lines in the literature. Hence we can explore the implications
of profit sharing in a more complete way.
Our analysis will offer a characterization of how the employment implications
of profit sharing depend on the interplay between labour market policies and
labour market imperfections. We will prove that profit sharing will stimulate
employment under conditions with sufficiently high unemployment benefit
replacement ratio and sufficiently strong labour market imperfections due to the
bargaining power of trade unions. In line with the terminology used by, for
example, Nickell (1997) we will refer to these circumstances as sufficiently strong
labour market rigidities. With such labour market rigidities profit sharing will
induce moderations of the base wages so as to boost aggregate employment.
Conversely, we also show that profit sharing will have negative employment
effects if labour market rigidities are sufficiently low.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 presents the basic structure of the model as
well as the time sequence of decisions under circumstances where a firm operates
in an environment characterized by uncertainty. The determination of effort by
employees and the employment decisions by firms are studied in section 3. In
section 4 we investigate the wage and profit sharing determination through
negotiations in the presence of efficiency wage considerations. Section 5 explores
the implications of profit sharing for equilibrium unemployment. Finally, we
present concluding comments in section 6.
2 Basic framework
We consider a firm operating in an environment characterized by uncertainty. In
conformity with the efficiency wage hypothesis we assume that the output of the
firm depends not only on the number of workers employed, but also on the effort
supplied by each worker. By employing L units of labour, each providing effort
denoted by a, the stochastic revenues accruing to the firm are given by
), L , a ( R  (2.1)
where  denotes a random revenue shock with a cumulative distribution function
F(), and a density function (), with the support [min,max]R+. We assume that
the production function R(a,L) satisfies the following conventional properties:
, 0 Ra   , 0 Raa    , 0 RL   , 0 RLL   and  . 0 RaL 9
time x x x
The profit share, , determines what fraction of the firm’s profits is transferred
to employed workers as part of the contract. We assume that profit share and base
wage, w, are negotiated simultaneously between labour market organizations
subject to labour demand and effort determination, ie the firm unilaterally
determines the employment level and the employee the effort level once the
conditions of the negotiations have been settled. In line with the tradition of
efficiency-wage models, we assume that the representative union member decides
on effort so as to maximize his objective function, which takes into account that
effort provision causes disutility. As the trade union are formed by homogenous
agents and as intra-organizational agency issues within the union are outside the
scope of our analysis, the union is assumed to be able to enforce the effort
provision by the representative union member so as to eliminate the potential free
rider problems.
1 At the stage of the base wage and profit share negotiations the
negotiated partners hold rational expectations regarding how the outcome of the
bargaining will impact on employment and effort.
We summarize the timing of the decisions made by the firm, the union and the
representative union member in Figure 1. In the subsequent sections we turn to the
analysis of the decisions taking place at the different stages of the firm-union
interaction by solving the game in reverse order.
Figure 1. Time sequence of decisions










                                                
1 If we were to apply an alternative formulation where individual efforts were not directly
observable and workers were heterogenous, group punishment or reward schemes would have to
be used for enforcement (see eg Holmström (1982)).10
3 Labour demand and equilibrium effort
We assume that the firm finances its activities by equity financing so that the
effective cost of labour is (1+r)wL, where w denotes the wage rate and L is
employment. From the firm’s point of view r denotes the opportunity cost of
capital. Under these circumstances the firm decides on employment L so as to
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Conditional on the negotiated base wage and profit share contract the
representative employed union member makes the effort decision in order to
maximize the expected utility
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where the increasing and convex function g(a)(g’(a),g’’(a)>0) is a monetary
representation of the disutility of effort.
The optimal combination of employment and effort provision is determined
by the system of first-order conditions
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According to equation (3.3) the firm chooses the employment level so as to
equalize the expected marginal return from labour (the term RL(a,L)) to the
effective wage cost (the term (1+r)). Equation (3.4) characterizes the
determination of effort by a representative employee so as to equalize the
marginal benefit to the marginal disutility of effort.
In order to highlight the economic mechanisms involved as transparently as
possible we make the following two assumptions regarding the functional forms
of the production technology and the disutility of employee effort.11
For the production technology we make
Assumption R: The technology is assumed to satisfy
.
) aL (




The parameter  is restricted to 0  <    <  1. Thus specification (R) describes a
concave production function exhibiting decreasing returns to scale with effort and
employment, separated as complementary production factors.
For the disutility of employee effort we make
Assumption G: The disutility of effort belongs to the class of iso-elastic functions
g(a) = a
1/ with 0 <  < 1.
This lies in conformity with the earlier discussion according to which the disutility
of effort can be captured through an increasing and convex relationship.
Under assumptions R and G the equilibrium condition (3.3) with respect to
the employment decision can be simplified to yield  ) r 1 ( w L a
1   
   , where 
denotes the expected value of revenue shock. This can be written as follows
 , a ) r 1 ( w L
1 *         (3.5)
where  ) 1 /( 1      denotes the direct wage elasticity of labour demand.
According to (3.5) labour demand depends negatively on the effective labour cost
and positively on the effort of employees.
Analogously, under the assumptions made we can rewrite (3.4) according to
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We can now summarize our characterization of the optimal combination of
employment and effort provision in
Proposition 1. Labour demand depends negatively on the effective labour cost
and positively on the effort of employees, while effort by employees depends
positively on the profit share, the base wage as well as the cost of capital.
Equation (3.5) suggests that labour demand does not directly depend on profit
sharing, which lies in conformity with empirical evidence (see eg Wadwani and12
Wall (1990)) and Cahuc and Dormont (1997)). Instead profit sharing enhances
productivity by stimulating effort provision and through that mechanism profit
sharing might possibly promote employment. The effective wage cost, w(1 + r),
impacts negatively on labour demand and in the presence of profit sharing this
increases the returns of effort provision. From (3.6) we can conclude that the
optimal effort provision depends on profit sharing in a way, which reminds of the
principal-agent literature. These aspects have not previously been explored in the
literature concerning union-firm wage bargaining.
Some aspects of the interactions between wage bargaining and efficiency
wage considerations have previously been analyzed in Lindbeck and Snower
(1991), Sanfey (1993), Summers (1988) and Garino and Martin (2000). In
contrast to our analysis, in these papers the effort function is assumed ad hoc and
it not derived from optimal behaviour. In Hendricks and Kahn (1991) the effort
function is derived from optimal behaviour, but they do not explore the
implications for equilibrium unemployment, which is our focus. Alterburg and
Straub (1998) incorporate the efficiency wage considerations derived from
optimal behaviour into an extended shirking model of the Shapiro-Stiglitz (1984)
type with decentralized union bargaining. In such a context they study the
relationship between aggregate labour market equilibrium and the benefit-
replacement ratio. Like us they abstract from potential free-rider problems
associated with effort determination, but they do not explore the employment
implications of profit sharing. Bulkley and Myles (1996) have also studied the
interaction between union power and shirking, but they confine attention to a
partial equilibrium analysis.
4 Base wage and profit share negotiation
We now turn to analyze the base wage and the profit share negotiations. We apply
the Nash bargaining solution within the context of the ‘right-to-manage’ approach
according to which employment is unilaterally determined by the firm, whereas
effort is provided subject to the discretion of employees.
We denote the relative bargaining power of the union by , and that of the
firm by (1 – ). In line with (3.2) the objective function of the trade union can be
written as
), a ( Lg b ) L N ( E
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where the first term captures the benefits from employment to employed workers,
the second term the benefits for unemployed union members and the last term13
denotes the disutility of effort for employed union members. We assume that the
threat points of the union and the firm are  Nb EU
o   and  , 0 E
o    respectively.
Thus, the difference 
o * * EU U ˆ E ) L , a ( EU EU     denotes the expected rent of the
union relative to the threat point. At the stage of bargaining the expected profits
and the expected rent of the union are evaluated at the equilibrium combination of
effort and employment.
Applying the traditional Nash bargaining solution the negotiating parties
decide on w and  in order to maximize
  
       
1 E ) 1 ( EU (4.1)
subject to the labour demand (3.5) and the effort determination (3.6). In the Nash
maximand (4.1)  ) L , a ( E E
* *     denotes the expected profit of the firm adjusted
with the factor  ) 1 (    in order to take the impact of profit sharing into account.
In anticipation of the equilibrium with respect to effort provision and
employment the expected profit of the firm is given by







The calculation of the union’s expected rent captures the idea that all the N
workers have incentives to seek employment. Those union members who are left
unemployed due to the limitations of the firm’s production enjoy the outside
option b. Thus the rent of the union, EU, is calculated to be
. ) a ( g ) L , a ( E
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where the subscripts w and  denote the partial derivatives with respect to the
wage rate and the profit share, respectively.
2 According to equations (4.4a) and
                                                
2 We assume that the sufficient second-order conditions for the Nash bargaining solution (i)
ww,  < 0 and (ii) ww – ww > 0 hold.14
(4.4b) the Nash bargaining wage rate and profit share are affected by the relative
bargaining powers as well as by the relative effects of the wage rate and profit
share on the objective functions of the negotiating agents. We find that the Nash
bargaining solution, w
N, can be expressed through the implicit representation
), a ( g
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w *  denotes the total wage elasticity of labour
demand, which incorporates both the direct negative employment effect of an
increased wage and the indirect positive effect whereby by a wage increase
stimulates effort provision.
In general, and unlike the earlier literature, (4.5) captures the idea that profit
sharing has two opposite effects on the negotiated base wage. On the one hand, it
tends to induce wage moderation as part of the compensation is shifted to the
performance-related profit share. On the other hand, the effort-enhancing effects
of profit sharing will also increase the costs of effort provision (the term g(a*))
and thereby increase the “individual rationality” constraint of each union member,
which will have a positive effect on the wage rate. By substituting (3.6) into (4.5)


























For the details of the calculations leading to (4.6) we refer to Appendix 1. We can
infer from (4.6) that the negotiated wage rate is proportional to the outside option
b, increasing in the bargaining power of the union, and decreasing as a function of
the total wage elasticity of labour demand. These effects coincide with those of
conventional wage bargaining models except for the generalization that the total
elasticity of labour demand incorporates an efficiency wage aspect. This effect
will increase the base wage through the added disutility of effort. Under the
plausible assumption that the wage-moderating effect dominates relative to the
cost of effort provision, ie if  1 ) 1 (     , we can now summarize our analysis in
Proposition 2: The Nash bargaining solution for the negotiated base wage is
proportional to the outside option available to the union, increasing in the15
bargaining power of the union, and decreasing in the total wage elasticity of
labour demand. Furthermore, profit sharing will moderate the negotiated base
wage if ( – 1) < 1.
The negotiated base wage (4.6) represents a generalization along several
dimensions relative to the traditional Nash bargaining solution. Our analysis with
the Nash bargaining solution (4.6) simultaneously includes efficiency wage
considerations like in Altenburg and Straub (1999), Bulkley and Myles (1996),
Lindbeck and Snower (1991) and Sanfey (1993) and the price of capital like in
Koskela, Schöb and Sinn (1998). But these models do not include profit sharing
as an incentive device. The effect of profit sharing on the wage rate is analyzed in
Holmlund (1991), but his model does not incorporate the important effort aspect
of profit sharing.
The generalized Nash bargaining solution (4.6) implies several interesting
special cases enabling interesting comparisons to relative to the existing
knowledge from the literature. We now turn to consider these special cases one by
one.
Firstly, in the absence of efficiency wage considerations we can reformulate
(4.6) according to
. b










Thus, in the absence of efficiency wage considerations the wage-moderating
effect of profit sharing is stronger as it is not reduced through the increased cost of
effort provision. In this case the total wage elasticity of labour demand is reduced
to the conventional elasticity.
Secondly, if all the bargaining power lies with the union ( = 1), the Nash























In particular, (4.8) demonstrates explicitly how efficiency wage considerations
and profit sharing impact on the optimal wage setting of a monopoly union. Profit
sharing will reduce the base wage, while efficiency wage considerations will raise16
it. In the absence of efficiency wage considerations and profit sharing, (4.8)
implies the well-known monopoly wage  . b
1
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Thirdly, if all the bargaining power lies with the firm ( = 0), the wage would




















According to (4.9) introduction of profit sharing makes it possible to reduce the
base wage of the workers even below the outside option.
In terms of profit sharing we can solve the equation defined by the first-order
condition (4.4b) to yield the following implicit representation of the negotiated
profit share
X ) 1 ( 1
) X 1 ( ) 1 ( N
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denoting the mark-up whereby the negotiated base wage w
N exceeds the outside
option b. For the details of the calculations leading to (4.10) we refer to Appendix
2. From (4.10) we can directly infer that the negotiated profit share is an





. In particular, by
allocating the bargaining power completely to the firm or to the union we obtain
the following two special cases:
. 1 and 1
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In its general implicit form (4.10) represents a polynomial equation of the third
degree. In general, we can guarantee the existence of solutions to such equations,
but an explicit characterization of the roots might often be very cumbersome.
We can now summarize our general analysis of the negotiated profit share by
Proposition 3: The Nash bargaining solution for the profit share, characterized
in implicit form by (4.10), is increasing in the bargaining power of the union, and17
it also depends on the wage elasticity of labour demand, the elasticity of disutility
of effort as well as on the cost of capital.
We can exemplify (4.10) for the case with  = 2. In this case (4.10) is reduced to
the following quadratic equation:
, 0
) 1 )( r 1 ( 2 ) 1 )( r 1 ( 2
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the explicit solution of which can be easily be characterized. For example, it can
be verified that  = 1 for the special case with  = 1.
5 Profit sharing and equilibrium unemployment
After having solved the sequence of decisions from a partial equilibrium
perspective we now move on to explore the implications of profit sharing on
equilibrium unemployment in a general equilibrium framework. Our goal is to
characterize the equilibrium unemployment as a function of the institutional
features of the labour market, in particular the labour market imperfections and
the coverage of the unemployment benefit system in terms of the benefit-
replacement ratio.
Until now our wage bargaining analysis has referred to a representative
industry, say i. By (4.6), for each representative industry the generalized Nash
bargaining solution has the form
b A w i
N
i  (5.1)


























For simplicity we focus on an economy with identical industries so that Ai = A.
In a general equilibrium context the term b should be re-interpreted to be the
relevant outside option. We specify the outside option as18
 , uB E
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where u denotes the unemployment rate, B the unemployment benefit and w
N is
the negotiated wage rate in all the identical industries (for a standard justification
we refer to, for example, Layard et al (1991), p. 100–101). The formulation (5.2)
captures the idea that all the identical industries adopt profit sharing so that an
unemployed worker faces the probability (1–u) of being employed in another
industry, which makes use of a similar compensation scheme. We further restrict
ourselves to the case of a constant replacement ratio q  B/w
N.
We now formulate the following intuition-based conjecture for the
employment effects of profit sharing in a general equilibrium context. In light of
the Nash bargaining solution (4.6), profit sharing will have a wage-moderating
effect, thereby contributing to a reduction in the outside option (5.2), and thus
stimulating employment. On the other hand, increased profit sharing will add a
direct positive effect to the relevant outside option, which will run counter to the
wage-moderating effect. Finally, the unemployment compensation will add to the
relevant outside option. If the benefit replacement ratio, q is sufficiently high, the
wage moderating effect of profit sharing makes it more likely that the overall
effect of profit sharing is employment-enhancing. Thus, from the form of the
relevant outside option in the general equilibrium context, we have reasons to
conjecture that profit sharing could stimulate employment as long as the benefit
replacement ratio is sufficiently high so as to make the wage-moderating effect of
profit sharing dominate relative to its direct effect. Our formal analysis will, in
fact, confirm this intuition.
Next we turn to the formal analysis. Combining (5.1), (5.3) and the
assumption of a constant replacement ratio we find that the aggregate
unemployment rate can be expressed according to
,
1
) r 1 (
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 denotes the wage mark-up induced by
the labour market imperfections.19














. Hence, a higher
benefit-replacement ratio and a higher wage mark-up, which is a positive function
of the trade union’s bargaining power and a negative function of the total wage
elasticity of labour demand, will increase equilibrium unemployment. Further,
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with the definitions of A and 
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From (5.6) we can conclude that the following relationship between profit sharing
and equilibrium unemployment holds:
.
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The function g(,	,), defined in (5.7), is strictly decreasing as a function of ,
strictly increasing as a function of  and strictly concave as a function of 	.




From (5.7) we can conclude that the impact of profit sharing on equilibrium
unemployment is determined by the interplay between labour market institutions
(captured by ), labour market policy (captured by the replacement ratio q),
market conditions (captured by ) as well as the disutility of effort (captured by
	).
We can summarize our analysis, which reached its culmination in (5.7), in
Proposition 4: Higher profit sharing will reduce equilibrium unemployment if the
benefit replacement ratio exceeds the threshold level g(,,), while the reverse
happens if the benefit-replacement ratio is below this threshold. The threshold20
depends negatively on the bargaining power of the union and positively on the
elasticity of labour demand, whereas the relationship between the threshold and
the disutility of effort is non-monotonic.
Broadly speaking, we can conclude from (5.7) that higher profit sharing will
reduce equilibrium unemployment under circumstances with sufficiently generous
labour market policies, ie when both the benefit-replacement ratio and the relative
bargaining power of trade unions are high. These circumstances are precisely
those where the demand for employment-promoting policies are particularly high.
Conversely, our model predicts that profit sharing might work very poorly as an
employment-stimulating instrument, or even be a destructive from the point of
view of employment, with sufficiently small labour market imperfections.
In Figures 1 and 2 we illustrate the threshold g(,	,) as a function of the
labour market institution (captured by ), the labour market policy (captured by
the replacement ratio q), the elasticity of effort (captured by 	) and the wage
elasticity of labour demand (captured by ). On the upper side of the curves profit
sharing serves as an instrument, which reduces equilibrium unemployment, while
on the lower side the reverse happens. In Figure 1 the threshold g(,	,) is drawn
for three different values of 	 with a fixed value of . In particular, Figure 1
illustrates that the threshold g(,	,) is non-monotonic as a function of 	 as these
curves may intersect. In Figure 2 we illustrate the impact of  on the threshold
g(,	,) by drawing this threshold for three different values of , while keeping
the value of 	 fixed.
From the comparative statics properties of g(,	,) we can directly draw the
conclusion that profit sharing is more likely to stimulate employment the higher is
the bargaining power of the trade union or the higher is the replacement ratio.
Furthermore, profit sharing will always promote employment as we approach the
limit case of effort costs approaching zero. Conversely, profit sharing can never
be employment-enhancing in the absence of an institution of unemployment
compensation.
We can summarize the policy lesson to be drawn from Proposition 4 as
follows. Profit sharing is an employment-enhancing instrument in environments
with sufficiently ‘rigid’ labour market institutions in the sense of sufficiently high
benefit replacement ratios and sufficiently strong bargaining power of the trade
unions. Under these circumstances the employment-enhancing effect of profit
sharing can be seen as a consequence of its wage-moderating effect. Profit sharing
is more likely to stimulate employment the larger are the labour market
imperfections in the sense of higher wage mark-ups.
Our results, characterized in proposition 4, add new dimensions to the
literature. We have shown that the impact of profit sharing on equilibrium
unemployment depends on the relationship between the benefit replacement ratio
and its critical value, which in turns depends on the mark-up factor, the wage21
elasticity of effort and the wage elasticity of labour demand. This critical value is
a decreasing function of the labour market imperfections. Thus, increased labour
market imperfections will increase the potential for profit sharing as employment-
enhancing instrument. By emphasizing how the employment consequences of
profit sharing depend on the interplay between labour market polices and labour
market imperfections we add an important element to the policy-oriented
literature. This literature (see, for example, Holmlund (1991) or Layard and
Nickell (1990)) has referred to particular properties of the production technology,
in particular the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital, as the
decisive features for evaluations of the employment implications of profit sharing.
In their models profit sharing would have no effect on equilibrium unemployment
in the absence of efficiency wage considerations if the firms operate with a Cobb-
Douglas technology.
6 Conclusions
This study has offered a unified framework for simultaneously analyzing the
determination of employment, effort provided by employed union members,
wages, and profit sharing under uncertainty generated by a stochastic revenue
shock. We initially showed that employment depends negatively on the effective
labour cost. The effective labour cost consists not only of the wage rate, but also
the cost of capital. Further, the effort provision by union members was shown to
depend positively not only on the usual efficiency wage considerations, but we
also characterized the effort-enhancing effects of profit sharing.
Base wage and profit share determination was analyzed by applying a
generalized Nash bargaining solution, which extended the wage bargaining
literature by incorporating not only efficiency wage considerations in the presence
of uncertainty, but also profit sharing. The negotiated profit share was
demonstrated to increase with the relative bargaining power of the trade union.
Further, profit sharing was proven to moderate the negotiated base wage if the
induced effort-promoting effect does not cause extremely high disutility costs.
Our analysis culminated in a characterization of how the equilibrium
unemployment implications of profit sharing depend on the interplay between
labour market policy and labour market imperfections. We proved that profit
sharing will reduce equilibrium unemployment under conditions with sufficiently
generous coverage of the unemployment benefit system and sufficiently strong
relative bargaining power or unions. Under such circumstances profit sharing will
induce moderations of the base wages so as to boost aggregate employment.
Even though there is empirical evidence on the determinants of employment
and wages, which lies in conformity with our findings (see eg Nickell (1997) or22
Nickell and Layard (1999)), it still remains an important task for future research to
evaluate the interactions between compensation structure and employment much
more systematically than what has been done thus far. In terms of equilibrium
unemployment consequences from profit sharing our analysis has highlighted the
significance of labour market policy in the form of the benefit-replacement ratio.
Under circumstances with sufficiently generous unemployment benefit systems
profit sharing was shown to stimulate employment. Furthermore, this was shown
to be more likely the higher is relative bargaining power of unions and the lower
is the wage elasticity of labour demand. It is an interesting and unexplored area
for future research to empirically test these predictions.23
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Appendix 1
Derivation of the Nash bargaining wage rate
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order condition (4.4a) of the Nash bargaining. We start by looking at the profit
response by the firm to a change in the wage rate. The optimal employment
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 is constant by (3.6). Hence, in light of equation
(4.2) we can conclude that








As for the trade union side we find by combination of (4.3) and (4.2) that the ratio
EU
EUw  can be expressed according to
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w *  denotes the total wage elasticity of wage
demand. Making use of the total wage elasticity of wage demand we can rewrite
(A1.2) according to
.
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Substituting (A1.1) and (A1.3) into equation (4.4a) of the text yields (4.5).26
Appendix 2
Derivation of the Nash bargaining profit share
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After some manipulation we end up with
,
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describing the negotiated mark-up between the base wage w
N and the outside
option b.28
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